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The European regulatory response to the volcanic ash crisis 




More than twenty years after the EU eliminated its internal land borders, the Union still lacks 
an integrated airspace. This seems to be the most immediate regulatory lesson of the recent 
volcanic ash crisis. Yet more research is needed before establishing its net effects. In this brief 
report, I will provide a first-hand analysis of the regulatory answer developed across Europe 
in the aftermath of the eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull. While reconstructing 
the unfolding of the events and the procedures followed by the regulators, I will attempt to 
address some of the questions that I have repeatedly asked myself when stranded in 
Washington DC between 16 and 25 April 2010. Who did the assessment of the hazard posed 
by volcanic ash to jetliners? Who was competent to take risk management decisions, such as 
the controversial flight bans? Is it true that the safe level of volcanic ash was zero? How to 
explain the shift to a new safety threshold (of 2,000 mg/m
3) only five days after the event? 
Did regulators overact? To what extent did they manage the perceived risk rather than the 
actual one? At a time when the impact of the volcanic ash cloud crisis is being closely 
scrutinised by both public authorities and the affected industries, it seems particularly timely 
to establish what happened during the worst aviation crisis in European history. This report 
was written one week after the event and relied on a limited number of sources available by 
30 April 2010. 
                                                 
1 Associate Professor of Law, HEC Paris. Comments are welcome at alemanno@hec.fr 
  1The emergency regulatory response 
Following the eruption of Icelandic volcano Eyjafjalläjokull on 14 April 2010, a cloud of ash 
quickly spread across Europe, helped by favourable winds. As a result, most European civil 
aviation authorities closed their respective airspaces
2. The flying bans came amid fears that 
the volcanic ash – a mixture of glass, sand and rock particles – could seriously damage 
aircraft engines. The national measures were based on the scientific advice provided by the 
Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre, London (VAAC)
3 and were implemented by the European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol)
4. From an average of 28,000 
flights a day in Europe, by 17 April, when less than half of European’s airspace was in use, 
there were only 5,335 actual flights. Yet, even before the bans were lifted, recriminations 
began. The national authorities came under pressure from European airlines, several of whom 
had conducted allegedly successful test flights in the supposed danger zone. After three days 
of flying bans, all major airlines vocally claimed that authorities had been overly cautious by 
overestimating, in the name of the controversial precautionary principle, the extent of the ash 
cloud and the hazard it represented for jet engines. In particular, critics have disputed the 
model used by the VAAC London, which was originally developed to track radioactive 
fallout from Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986
5, and dismissed it as “theoretical”
6. National 
                                                 
2 At its height on April 17-18 April 2010, 17 EU Member States had a full airspace closure and two were 
partially  closed. At the same time, six non-EU States were fully closed. 
3 Nine Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres around the world are responsible for advising international aviation of the 
location and movement of clouds of volcanic ash. They are part of an international system set up by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) called the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW). In 
particular, the London VAAC is responsible for monitoring and forecasting the movement of volcanic ash over 
the United Kingdom, Iceland and the north-eastern part of the North Atlantic Ocean. 
4 Contrary to what was reported by most media, Eurocontrol is an international, not an EU, organisation. It was 
established in 1960 by Germany, Belgium, France, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands through the Eurocontrol International Convention relating to Co-operation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation signed in Brussels “to strengthen their cooperation in matters of air navigation and in particular to 
provide for the common organisation of the air traffic services in the upper air space”. This convention entered 
into force in 1963 and has 38 Member countries, including the European Union. 
5 The Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment (NAME) has evolved into an all-purpose 
dispersion model capable of predicting the transport, transformation and deposition of a wide class of airborne 
materials, e.g. nuclear material, volcanic emissions, biomass smoke, chemical spills, foot-and-mouth disease. 
See ICAO’s Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds - Doc 9691. 
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consistent with the guidelines developed by the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO)
7. In turn, scientists have strenuously defended the predictions made by the NAME 
atmospheric dispersion model underpinning the ICAO guidelines
8.  
Meanwhile, the cloud was not moving. As Europe was facing another week of disruption, the 
European Commission took the initiative over the weekend of 17-18 April, with the Spanish 
Presidency and Eurocontrol, to propose a co-ordinated European approach. As the situation 
evolved, the model and the national risk management procedures were tested. It became clear 
to the EU Member States, national air safety authorities, national air traffic controllers and 
Eurocontrol that a more differentiated assessment of risk from the ash cloud was needed. But, 
under a prisoner’s dilemma-like scenario, no Member State could act independently by 
departing from the ICAO guidelines and taking the first step to introduce change. These 
guidelines are crystal clear: “The recommended procedure in the case of volcanic ash is 
exactly same as with low-level wind shear, regardless of ash concentration — AVOID 
AVOID AVOID.”
9 Five days after the enforcement of the national flying bans, the European 
Member States unanimously agreed, following an extraordinary meeting co-chaired by 
Eurocontrol and the European Commission on 19 April to move to “a co-ordinated European 
approach in response to the crisis”
10.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
6 Statement by Giovanni Bisignani, Director general and chief executive of the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA), on 19 April 2010. 
7 ICAO was created in 1944 by the Convention on International Civil Aviation and is headquartered in Montreal, 
Canada. The guidelines are contained in the Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical 
Clouds - Doc 9691. 
8 See section 3.4 Forecasting the Movement of Volcanic Ash Clouds, in ICAO’s Manual on Volcanic Ash, 
Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds - Doc 9691.. 
9 Ibidem, at point 3.4.8. 
10 See Volcanic Ash Crisis: Frequently Asked Questions, MEMO/10/143. 
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space and hence reduced the human and economic impact on passengers, airlines and cargo
11. 
The new measures came into force at 08.00 hours CET on 20 April and established three 
types of zones, depending on the degree of contamination. The first zone was located in the 
central nucleus of the emissions, where a full restriction of operations was maintained; the 
second consisted of an intermediary zone where Member States could allow flights “in a 
coordinated manner [with other members]” but with additional restrictions and safety 
controls; and the third zone, not affected by the ash, had no restrictions. These procedures, 
based on a more differentiated risk assessment and paving the way for more coordinated 
decisions across the states, allowed for “a progressive and coordinated opening of European 
Air Space”
12. By 22 April, eight days after the eruption began, flights were back to normal, 
with 27,284 flights compared to 28,578 expected on the same day two weeks earlier
13. 
Interestingly enough, Transport Ministers agreed to ask the Commission, “as long as the air 
traffic in Europe is not totally open”, to contribute to “a smooth coordination that allows the 
mobility of European citizens through other modes of transport.”
14 Thus, a temporary transfer 
of sovereign powers took place. 
The calm after the storm – one might have thought. Yet, the situation created by the 
protracted closure of the European airspace has been so extraordinary that the regulatory 
action responsible for the disruption is still (and will remain) at centre of growing 
controversy. Beyond the personal dramatic situation for millions of passengers who were 
                                                 
11 These procedures were presented by EU Commission Vicepresident Kallas to an extraordinary meeting of 
Transport Ministers, chaired by Spanish Minister José Blanco, and finally endorsed at the same meeting. 
12 Extraordinary meeting of Ministers of Transport, April 19, 2010, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/trans/113899.pdf 
13 See Eurocontrol Volcanic Ash Could Timeline, available at http://www.eurocontrol.int/corporate/public/ 
standard _page/volcanic_ash_cloud_chronology.html (Last visited on April 30, 2010). 
14 Extraordinary meeting of Ministers of Transport, 19 April 2010, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/trans/113899.pdf 
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15, the air 
industry has incurred significant costs and suffered reduced revenues
16. Also, airports have 
been severely hit, as well as ground handling services and tour operators
17. Moreover, the 
disruption may also have some unforeseen financial consequences in the context of the EU’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Indeed, being 2010 the monitoring year for the 
establishment of the number of Aviation Allowances (AAs) allocated for free to airlines, the 
reduced activity over the past week of April could affect the distribution of those allowances 
between aircraft operators. In particular, this distributional effect is likely to be felt more 
strongly by airlines operating in those parts of the EU that were hardest hit by the flight bans. 
The regulatory consequences stemming from the crisis were not limited to the aviation sector. 
Thus, for instance, since 14 April 2010, the European Commission has raised questions on the 
public health concerns resulting from the ash cloud that has covered large parts of the 
European Union. As a result, the Commission asked first the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) to assess potential public health impact of the ash cloud
18. 
Second, on 20 April 2010, it turned to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to obtain 
urgent advice on the possible risks for public and animal health of the contamination of the 
feed and food chain
19. The EFSA, in record time, concluded that, based on the available 
                                                 
15 Despite the exceptional circumstances, the EU Commission considers that the Regulation on Air Passengers 
Rights (EC Regulation 261/2004) remains fully applicable. Yet, it admits that, in the ongoing review of the 
regulation, it will “take into account the experience of the volcano ash crisis to decide whether improvements are 
necessary”. See Note d’information de M. Kallas “Conséquences du nuages de cendres générée par l’éruption 
volcanique survenue en Islande sur le trafic aérien”, SEC(2010) 533, at para 26.   
16 Although at the end of April it was too early to measure the impact, since some traffic that did not occur 
during the closure of the airspace might have taken place later on, the first figures provided by the sector 
calculate losses of several hundred million Euros. 
17 Under EU law, tour operators are required to provide repatriation of stranded passengers and to refund or offer 
alternative arrangements to customers who have not started their journey as a result of the European airspace’s 
closure. 
18 The advice from the ECDC indicated that the amount of ash likely to come to ground in the aftermath of the 
eruption was minimal, if any, and impact on health was equally minimal. This position was confirmed by the 
European Environmental Agency, which concluded that there has been no deterioration of air quality associated 
with the volcanic ash plume. 
19 In accordance with Article 31 of the Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, the Commission asked EFSA to provide 
by 22 April 2010 scientific assistance on the possible risks for public and animal health via food, including 
drinking water and feed in case of a significant ash fall, based on the chemical composition of volcanic ash. 
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drinking water, vegetables, fruit, fish, milk, meat and feed was regarded as negligible in the 
EU. 
 
Regulatory science of volcanic emissions 
It seems undisputed (supported by Wikipedia articles too) that volcanic ash can cause jet 
engines to fail in flight
20. An engine’s heat melts the finely-ground rock, which in turn 
proceeds to encrust the cooler parts of the mechanism, stopping it from working. This 
phenomenon is called sand-blasting and it came to wide public attention in 1982 when two 
jumbo passenger jets lost engine power due to the plane flying through clouds of ash from the 
eruptions of the Galunggun volcano in Indonesia
21. Since then, volcanic ash has been 
internationally recognised as a source of potential hazard for aviation and triggered a wide 
range of initiatives by ICAO aimed at mitigating that hazard. 
These incidents undoubtedly served to increase interest in the aviation community in volcanic 
hazard. Yet, although they revealed that mitigation of the hazard posed by volcanic ash to 
aviation safety would require the cooperation and efforts of volcanologists, meteorologists, air 
traffic managers, engine manufacturers and pilots, they were not enough to capture the 
interest of the airline industry. It seems that the same airline companies that today blame the 
authorities and the scientists for being overly cautious have always been rather reluctant to 
commission studies on the impact of ash on their aircraft. As a result, given the lack of 
                                                 
20 To know more on volcanic ash and its effects on aviation, see V.M. Branningan, Alice’s Adventures in 
Volcano Land: The Use and Abuse of Expert Knowledge in Safety Regulation, European Journal of Risk 
Regulation, issue 2, 2010. On volcanism and its consequences, see M.R. Rampino, Super-volcanism and other 
geophysical processes of catastrophic import, in Global Catastrophic Risks (N. Bostrom and M.M. Cirkovic, 
eds), Oxford, 2008. 
21 Volcanic Ash and Aviation Safety: Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Volcanic Ash and 
Aviation Safety, (edited by Thomas Casadevall, Seattle, 1991), US Geological Survey Bulletin 2047, p. iii-iv. 
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flight safety seems to be the complete avoidance of these ash clouds. As mentioned above, 
this is the risk management strategy enshrined in the ICAO’s Manual which explains why 
national authorities have consistently held that the presence of virtually any volcanic ash was 
a threat to aviation.  
The major obstacle to resuming flights has been understanding aircraft tolerance levels to ash. 
It seems that manufacturers have agreed on increased tolerance levels in low ash density 
areas, but have refused to disclose their data. It remains therefore to be seen how exactly 
authorities moved from the ICAO’s recommended zero safety level to a 2,000 micrograms of 
ash per cubic metre within the space of five days. 
By implicitly acknowledging the inherent limits of the predominant risk analysis model, the 
EU Commission has decided, in the aftermath of the crisis, to take two initiatives: 
-  the creation of a working group of experts, encompassing representatives from 
Eurocontrol, the European Air Safety Agency
22, Member States, ICAO and the air 
industry. The idea is to entrust this group with the task of establishing an inventory of 
the relevant technological and methodological tools at European level and in the 
Member States, and a research roadmap to make the most up-to-date and validated 
tools available to facilitate  making appropriate decisions. 
-  the elaboration of a new methodology and coherent approach to safety risk assessment 
and risk management in relation to the closure of airspace to be proposed to ICAO. 
                                                 
22 The European Air Safety Agency is based in Cologne and employs some 500 professionals from across 
Europe. It provides expert advice to the EU for drafting new legislation and is in charge of the implementation 
and monitoring safety rules, including inspections in the Member States as well as of the approval of 
organisations involved in the design, manufacture and maintenance of aeronautical products. 
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in September 2010
23. 
The not-yet European sky  
As is well known by now, EU integration does not yet extend to air traffic management
24. 
Only the Member States can decide whether or not to close their airspace. As a result, the EU 
boasts 27 different air traffic zones, each able to impose a flying ban. Fragmentation in the 
European Union is the result of a history where air traffic control has been (and still is) 
closely associated with sovereignty, and hence confined within national borders. Indeed, air 
traffic control is still perceived as governed by both national defence and sovereign interests. 
This also reflects one of the tenets of the Chicago Convention according to which each State 
is responsible for safety oversight in civil aviation within its jurisdiction
25.  
Yet, it would be a mistake to think that efforts have not been made towards integration of the 
EU airspace
26. Following the adoption of the Single Europe Sky (SES I) legislation in 2004, 
air traffic management was brought under the EU common transport policy
27. The idea was to 
redesign the European sky according to traffic flows rather than national borders. Yet, as 
unambiguously exemplified by the patchwork regulatory response to the current crisis, a truly 
‘single’ sky has not been achieved.  
                                                 
23 See Note d’information de M. Kallas “Conséquences du nuages de cendres générée par l’éruption volcanique 
survenue en Islande sur le trafic aérien”, SEC(2010) 533, at para 44. 
24 Air Traffic Management (ATM) encompasses the functions required to ensure safe and efficient movement of 
aircraft during all phases of operations (Air Traffic Services (ATS)), airspace management (ASM) and air traffic 
flow management (ATFM). 
25 Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in Chicago in 1944. 
26 Efforts to shape an EU airspace date back 1996 when the European Commission published a White Paper on 
Air Traffic Management (“Freeing Europe’s Airspace”) and were followed by the 1997 initiative of Eurocontrol 
members to open up Eurocontrol membership to the European Community. 
27 The SES I consists of a Framework Regulation plus three technical regulations on the provision of air 
navigation services, organisation and use of the airspace and the interoperability of the European air traffic 
management network. See Regulation (EC) No 549/2004  of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 
March 2004 laying down the framework for the creation of the Single European Sky. 
  8To remedy this situation, another reform, the ‘Single Sky Package’ (SES II) was adopted by 
the European Parliament and the Council in November 2009 
28. To accelerate the full 
implementation of the SES, the Commission seems ready to leverage the volcanic ash crisis to 
create political momentum. In the aftermath of the crisis, it came out with a set of 
encouraging proposals. 
First, the creation of a crisis coordination cell, gathering together Eurocontrol, EASA, 
Member States and air transport stakeholders. This is exactly what the EU did not have 
available during the crisis. This cell would institutionalise some of the ad hoc mechanisms 
born during the crisis and would be empowered with the possibility of launching unmanned 
aircraft vehicles (UAV) to collect data. 
Second, nomination of the Functional Airspace Blocks (FAB) coordinators to facilitate their 
quick creation. FABs are airspace blocks, nine in number, based on operational requirements. 
They will be established regardless of State boundaries, where the provision of air navigation 
services and related ancillary functions are optimised and/or integrated. They are foreseen in 
SES II and their implementation will be anticipated in view of supporting a coordinated reply 
to the Crisis Cell recommendations
29.  
Third, appointment of the central European network management by the end of 2010. It could 
reasonably be argued that if the network management function had been designated prior to 
the crisis, the EU would have benefited from a more harmonised and coordinated approach to 
the risk and flow/capacity assessment; this would have given it the ability to formulate 
proposals for solutions quickly to be tabled in the context of SES governance structures, 
                                                 
28 EC Regulation 1070/2009. 
29 In accordance with Article 8 of the Framework Regulation, the European Commission has issued a mandate to 
the Eurocontrol Agency for support in the establishment of Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs). 
  9taking also into account the need for coordination with other neighbouring countries and 
regions. 
 
Fourth, acceleration of the implementation of EASA’s competences in Air Traffic 
Management (ATM) safety. EASA is likely to assume these new competences before 2012 to 
ensure the safety of the European network, thus ensuring a “full system, gate-to-gate” 
approach to safety.  
 
Lessons learned and open questions 
 
The protracted closure of the European airspace following the volcanic eruption in Iceland, 
together with the initially fragmented regulatory answer, has shown that while precautionary 
measures may be life-saving, they may also be not only logistically disrupting but also 
economically very costly. Whether and how these costs should be taken into account at the 
risk management stage represents one of the most difficult questions surrounding the 
principle. According to many, this is also one of its greatest weaknesses
30. Should the 
expected value of the precautions have been compared against their expected costs?
31 The EU 
version of the principle, reflecting the Judaeo-Christian belief that life is without price, does 
not seem to admit any room for this kind of regulatory exercise. However, a comparative 
analysis of expected costs and expected benefits of precautionary measures could serve as a 
useful check against overreaction to recent incidents.  
                                                 
30 See for example C. Sunstein, Worst-Case Scenarios, Harvard University Press, 2007. 
31 Even in the US, where value has been conceived for long time solely in monetary terms, there is an emerging 
consensus that both expected value and expected costs should be measured in terms of well-being. Yet, to say 
the least, people disagree on how to define well-being (or welfare). See, e.g., R. Revesz & M. Livermore, 
Retaking Rationality, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008; M. Adler & E. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-
Benefit Analysis, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006. 
  10This seems especially true if one considers the incentives that regulators have in the aftermath 
of a crisis to pay undue attention to the worst-case scenarios. Moreover, it is often argued that 
the inclusion of precautionary costs could also induce regulators, when examining risk vs risk 
tradeoffs, to spot ‘substitute risks’, i.e. hazards that materialise or are increased by risk 
regulation policies
32. Thus, for instance, after the attacks of “9/11”, many Americans switched 
from flying to driving and because driving is more dangerous than flying, thousands of people 
have died as a result of the switch. It is probably too early to detect the impact that flying bans 
have had on other public transport accidents but it might be interesting to look at these data. 
 
On the other hand, one may wonder how costs can be realistically computed in a situation in 
which, by definition, it is not possible to assign probabilities to the various scenarios because 
of the alleged level of uncertainty involved. But is it true that authorities did not know how 
much ash a jet could safely tolerate? Or perhaps they knew this but had no means of 
measuring the average density of ash in the atmosphere.  Should it emerge that authorities at 
the time of the eruption did not know either of the two, their regulatory response would seem 
to be justified and could escape criticism. On the other hand, if they did know, or could have 
known, this information with some more diligence and/or cooperation with airline industries 
and engine manufacturers, then some claims of precautionary abuse might be justified. A 
question worth asking is whether in these circumstances some forms of regulators’ liability 
should emerge. However, if it is true that airlines and engine manufacturers have been 
reluctant to commission studies on the impact of ash on their aircraft, the claim of 
overreaction would lose some of its evocative power. 
 
                                                 
32 See J.D. Graham & J.B. Wiener, Risk vs. Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment (Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1995). 
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For the time being, the European Commission seems more prone to look into the future than 
into the past. At the time this issue of the EJRR goes to press, it is about to adopt a set of 
immediate and midterm measures to take into account the economic consequences of the 
crisis on the airline sector
33. By leveraging the disruption caused by the volcanic ash crisis, 
the Commission is likely to accelerate the implementation of SES II, thus institutionalising 
some of the ad hoc mechanisms and procedures developed during the outbreak. Undoubtedly, 
this crisis has added new impetus to the long-running struggle to unite Europe’s airspace. The 
costs of a Non-European sky have turned out to be higher than expected. As if any proof were 
needed, it is time for the EU to conquer its own sky.  
 
 
33 See Note d’information de M. Kallas “Conséquences du nuages de cendres générée par l’éruption volcanique 
survenue en Islande sur le trafic aérien”, SEC(2010) 533. 